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Abstract—The rise of online aggression on social media is
evolving into a major point of concern. Several machine and deep
learning approaches have been proposed recently for detecting
various types of aggressive behavior. However, social media
are fast paced, generating an increasing amount of content,
while aggressive behavior evolves over time. In this work, we
introduce the first practical, real-time framework for detecting
aggression on Twitter via embracing the streaming machine
learning paradigm. Our method adapts its ML classifiers in an
incremental fashion as it receives new annotated examples and is
able to achieve the same (or even higher) performance as batch-
based ML models, with over 90% accuracy, precision, and recall.
At the same time, our experimental analysis on real Twitter data
reveals how our framework can easily scale to accommodate the
entire Twitter Firehose (of 778 million tweets per day) with only
3 commodity machines. Finally, we show that our framework is
general enough to detect other related behaviors such as sarcasm,
racism, and sexism in real time.
Index Terms—online aggression detection, streaming machine
learning, social media
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last years, online aggression has spiked across
the Web, with many incidents of abusive behavior being
reported in different contexts [1], [2]. Aggressive behavior
can be observed in any type of platform, independently of
the audience it aims to engage with respect to age, gender,
etc., and the utility or service the specific platform offers. In
particular, aggressive, abusive, offensive, bullying, racist, or
sexist behavior has been studied in different online contexts:
cyberbullying and aggression on Twitter and other media
(e.g., [3]–[7]), hateful speech (e.g., [8], [9]), and offensive
or abusive language (e.g., [10]–[12]), to name a few. This
problem has been studied in different social media platforms
such as Twitter [4], [5], Instagram [13], [14], YouTube [11],
Yahoo Finance [15], Yahoo Answers [16], 4chan [17], and
across various demographics (e.g., teenagers vs. adults, men
vs. women, etc. [1], [18]).
With all the negative publicity this problem regularly re-
ceives in the news, popular online platforms have tried to
curb the problem by deploying new features and methods.
For example, Twitter [19] and Instagram [20] have recently
proposed new features that aim to limit or block the ability
of aggressors to bully by posting messages on their victims’
pages, profiles, or walls. However, even with all this effort in
place, the problem still persists. This can be attributed to the
following aspects of the problem.
First, many of these online platforms enable users to engage
in a fast-paced generation of content across different topics,
thus, facilitating an exponential growth of user-contributed
posts: 2.5 trillion posts to date on Facebook [21]; Insta-
gram users hitting the “like” button 4.2 billion times per
day [21]; more than 2 million “snaps” created every minute
on Snapchat [21]; 778 million tweets posted per day on
Twitter [22]; etc. Therefore, the platforms have a constantly
increasing workload to process for detecting abusive behavior.
Second, users (and especially millennials, Generation Z, and
even Generation Alpha) adapt quickly to new community
rules or algorithms of platforms rolled out to detect and ban
such behavior. In fact, they typically find “innovative” ways
to circumvent the rules in order to achieve their aggressive
goals, by using new words or special text characters to
signify their aggression but avoid detection [23]. Third, this
complex behavior is difficult to model, as it highly depends
on the context, cultural background of users, nature of user
interaction, platform features, scope and utility, etc. Finally,
detecting this behavior is a minority class problem, making
it harder to address it effectively with automated systems, as
there are not many examples to train classifiers on, at any
given random sample of data.
Unfortunately, past academic and industry efforts to study
the problem and propose machine learning (ML) algorithms
to detect such behavior have not addressed the above aspects
in an effective manner. As most current ML approaches used
are batch-based, a trained model can become deprecated after
some time [24], while many approaches are computationally
expensive for both training and testing purposes [12], [25]. It
becomes apparent that there is urgent need for new, real-time
ML methods that: 1) adapt their ML modeling in a similarly
fast rate as the content becomes available, keeping the ML
models up-to-date with users’ adaptability, and 2) can scale
to process the increasing workload from generated content in
real time.
In this work, we address this gap, and introduce the first,
practical, and real-time framework for aggression detection
on Twitter. Departing from past works, and embracing the
streaming ML modeling paradigm, our method adapts its
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ML classifiers in an incremental fashion as it receives new
annotated examples. More over, we argue on the framework’s
ability to easily scale out and accommodate the whole Twitter
Firehose stream with a handful of machines.
In summary, our contributions are as follows:
• We propose the first real-time detection framework for
aggression on Twitter. We designed it to be extensible,
scalable, and accurate, thus being able to provide useful
alerts to human moderators. We employ state-of-the-art
streaming ML methods such as Hoeffding Trees, Adap-
tive Random Forests, and Streaming Logistic Regression.
• We propose an adaptive bag-of-words method for improv-
ing the ML modeling performance while new aggressive
cases appear. This feature allows the framework to further
adapt in transient aggressive behaviors such as the use of
new (key)words for spreading abuse or hate speech.
• We design our framework to be deployable on state-of-art
streaming engines such as Apache Spark and discuss how
it can be extended and run on other streaming platforms.
• We demonstrate its effectiveness to detect aggressive
behavior at real time on a large dataset of 86k tweets,
annotated for this context. We show that the results
acquired from the streaming methods can be as good or
even better than typical batch-based ML methods, with
over 90% performance in multiple metrics (accuracy, pre-
cision, recall). We also perform an in-depth investigation
of how factors such as preprocessing and normalization
can affect streaming ML performance. Furthermore, we
test the pipeline on two other relevant, but smaller Twitter
datasets, and demonstrate the method’s ability to detect
similar behaviors with minimal adaptation and tuning.
• Finally, we show how the framework can easily scale to
increase its throughput to over 14k tweets/sec and accom-
modate all the Twitter Firehose with only 3 commodity
machines.
Outline. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II reviews prior related work. Section III presents the design
and implementation of our framework, while Section IV
discusses the dataset and the features employed for detecting
aggression. Section V describes our evaluation methodology
and results on a real–world Twitter dataset. Finally, Section VI
discusses possible future directions and concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Numerous studies have focused on the detection of abusive
behavior on online social networks. Under the umbrella of
“abuse”, various abnormal behaviors may be included, such as
offensive language and hate speech, bullying and aggression,
sexual exploitation, etc. For instance, authors in [11] proposed
a method to detect highly probable users in producing of-
fensive content in YouTube comments, while authors in [26]
focused on hate speech detection, and specifically to detect
racism and sexism. More recently, a method for detecting
bullying and aggressive behavior on Twitter has been pro-
posed, where a wide range of profile, content, and network
characteristics was considered for characterizing users’ online
behaviors [5].
Towards an efficient detection of abusive behavior, ML-
based approaches are among the most commonly considered
ones nowadays. Many of the previous works used traditional
ML classifiers, such as logistic regression [8], [9], [12], [27],
support vector machines [28], or ensemble classifiers [29]. For
instance, authors in [12] used a ML-based method to perform
hate speech detection on Yahoo Finance and News data, while
authors in [29] used a combination of probabilistic, rule- and
spatial-based classifiers with a vote ensemble meta-classifier
to study the spread of online hate speech on Twitter.
More recently, deep learning architectures have also been
employed, in an effort to improve the detection efficiency.
For instance, in [26] various deep learning architectures were
evaluated, including Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs),
Long Short-Term Memory Networks (LSTMs), and Fast-
Text [30]. In the same direction, in [25] a CNN with Gated
Recurrent Unit (GRU) network was used, combined with
word embeddings, to detect hate speech on Twitter. In [31]
authors also used deep learning models (CNNs) to detect
hate speech on Twitter. Finally, for the detection of abusive
and aggressive behaviors, authors in [5] experimented with
both traditional machine learning methods (i.e., probabilistic,
tree-based, and ensemble classifiers), as well as deep neural
networks, i.e., Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN), with the
first ones resulting to a better performance.
So far, most of the previous work has focused on the
detection of abusive behaviors on a “batch mode”. That is,
the objective was: given a set of data to train an ML classifier
to identify with the maximum possible effectiveness different
types of abusive behaviors that are evident in the data. To
increase the accuracy of the detection process, some of the
proposed approaches are cost-ineffective in terms of the time
required for both training and testing purposes. But as we live
in an ever-evolving world, it is of paramount importance to
develop methods that can support the continuous monitoring of
the content produced in online sources, so that the detection of
abusive behaviors can be performd in its infancy. Towards this
direction, authors in [24] proposed a multi-stage cyberbullying
detection solution for Vine comments in order to reduce both
the classification time and the time to raise alerts. Specifically,
an “incremental computation” approach was followed at both
the feature extraction and classification stages, where data
from previous stages were used within the current stage
in order to lower the computational complexity. Focusing
on Instagram, authors in [14] proposed a two-stage online
framework for cyberbullying detection, where comments are
examined as they become available. To ensure the scalability
of the detection process, an online feature selection approach
was proposed for reducing the number of features used for
classification (instead of constantly using the same set of
features). Unlike our approach that detects aggression on
individual tweets, the two aforementioned approaches focus
on detecting cyberbullying at the level of media sessions (i.e.,
for a set of comments).
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Fig. 1: Overall system architecture for aggression detection on Twitter.
Contributions. To the best of our knowledge, the present work
is the first to apply the streaming ML modeling paradigm for
detecting aggressive or other forms of inappropriate behaviors
on social media. Unlike existing works, our framework is able
to adapt the ML models quickly and efficiently as content
becomes available, while at the same time it is able to scale
and process an increasing workload in real time.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The overall goal of this work is to produce a detection
framework for Twitter that is capable of: (i) detecting ag-
gressive behavior in real time as soon as new tweets arrive;
(ii) dynamically updating the classification model in real
time as soon as new labeled tweets arrive; and (iii) scaling
to accommodate for the ever-increasing volume of tweets
without sacrificing the classification performance. The first
two are achieved via adopting the streaming data paradigm
(i.e., computing on data directly as it is produced), while the
latter is achieved by ensuring that almost all computations can
be parallelized and executed in a distributed setting. In the
remainder of this section, we present the overall system archi-
tecture, discuss how our approach can scale out to handle the
entire Twitter Firehose, and introduce a few of the supported
state-of-the-art streaming classification methods.
A. System Overview
Figure 1 shows the overall system architecture for detecting
aggressive behavior on Twitter, which involves the following
steps: (1) preprocessing, (2) feature extraction, (3) normaliza-
tion, (4) training, (5) prediction, (6) alerting, (7) evaluation,
(8) sampling, and (9) labeling. The system input consists
of two streams with unlabeled and labeled tweets, while
multiple outputs are possible, including alerts of aggressive
tweets, evaluation metrics, and sample tweets for downstream
labeling.
Data Input. The Twitter Streaming API constitutes the first
input to our system and provides access to a stream of tweets
in JSON format. Each JSON payload contains information
about the tweet (e.g., the textual content, posted timestamp,
whether it is a retweet or a reply) and the user who posted
the tweet (e.g., name, account creation timestamp, number of
friends and followers). The second input is a stream of labeled
tweets using the same JSON format as the original tweets, plus
an attribute containing the class label (e.g., normal, abusive,
hateful; see Section IV-A). With the exception of the training
step that only applies to labeled tweets, all other steps process
both unlabeled and labeled tweets in the same manner.
Preprocessing. The first step is to clean the tweet text by
removing numbers, punctuation marks, special symbols (e.g.,
$, %, *) and URLs, as well as condensing white space. In
addition, we remove tweet-specific content, including known
abbreviations (e.g., RT), hashtags, and user mentions. Such
preprocessing and cleaning are commonly used to simplify
and improve the following feature extraction step.
Feature extraction. We extract an array of user profile, text,
and social network features as detailed in Section IV-B.
Normalization. This step involves scaling attribute data to fall
within a predefined range, such as between 0 and 1. We have
implemented three common forms of normalization:
• minmax, which uses the min and max values of each
feature to scale a given value to be in the range [0-1];
• minmax without outliers, which rescales the min and max
of each feature by removing statistical outliers, before
applying minmax normalization;
• z-score, which normalizes a given value to belong in a
distribution with zero mean and unit standard deviation
based on the mean and variance of the feature.
The statistics required for normalization (e.g., min, max, mean)
can be provided as input or they can be easily computed
incrementally during the data stream processing. As the perfor-
mance of some streaming classification models is not affected
by normalization, this step is optional.
Training. Given a stream of labeled feature instances, the
training step will incrementally update the underlying stream-
ing classification model. Unlike batch processing (where an
instance is processed multiple times), in streaming ML each
instance is only processed once, the model is updated, and
then that instance is discarded. Hence, it is not necessary to
store a historical training set and periodically retrain the model
as is typically done in a batch setting. Another benefit of
stream-based learning is the ability to deal with concept drift,
which takes place when the data distribution evolves over time.
Therefore, the streaming model remains always up-to-date.
Prediction. This step uses the streaming model to predict
the label of each instance by computing the probabilities that
a particular instance belongs to each class label. Prediction
is performed for both unlabeled and labeled instances for
different reasons. The former is used for detecting aggressive
tweets and raising appropriate alerts. The later is useful for
evaluating the classification performance of the model by
comparing the predicted labels with the true ones.
Alerting. Depending on the prediction’s outcome, this step
will raise an alert whenever an aggressive behavior is detected.
Given that these alerts are raised in real time, multiple options
exist for how they can be handled: (i) they can be sent to
human moderators for evaluating the suspected tweet, or (ii)
an automatic warning can be posted on the tweet, or (iii)
the tweet can be automatically removed. It is also possible
to maintain an alert history per user, which can be used
for automatically suspending a user account when repeated
offenses are detected.
Evaluation. The classification of labeled instances is used for
computing important metrics, including the confusion matrix,
accuracy, precision, recall, F1-score, and others. Such metrics
are used for evaluating the performance of the streaming model
and revealing how good the predictions are. The evaluation
step also computes some interesting statistics regarding the
unlabeled instances such as the distribution of predicted class
labels and how they change over time.
Sampling. The key application for sampling is to select a
(small) subset of tweets for manual inspection and labeling.
As aggressive tweets are typically a minority in real-world
settings, random sampling would result in an imbalanced
dataset. One way to address this issue is to implement a
boosted random sampling technique that utilizes the predicted
label for boosting a random sample with tweets that are likely
to be aggressive (without biasing the resulting dataset) [6].
Labeling. The goal of this step is to generate new labeled
tweets that can be used for improving the performance of the
streaming model over time. Labeling can be performed by
specialized moderators or via a crowd-sourcing platform like
CrowdFlower [6], and is beyond the scope of this paper.
B. Scaling ML Streaming Methods
Social media generate an enormous amount of data, on the
order of several hundred GBs per day. According to the latest
statistics, there are over 778 million tweets shared per day,
amounting to 3.1 TB of data (in JSON format) per day [22].
Hence, for any online aggression detection solution to be
practical, it must be able to scale to handle such massive data
volumes and rates.
Currently, there are several distributed stream processing
engines (DSPEs) that can process data in real time on clusters
of commodity hardware, such as Apache Spark Streaming,
Storm, Heron, and Flink. We have implemented our framework
on Spark Streaming [32], an extension of the Apache Spark
platform that enables data stream processing over multiple
sources. Spark is a programmable framework for massive
distributed processing of datasets, called Resilient Distributed
Datasets (RDDs) [33]. In Spark Streaming, the underlying data
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abstraction is a discretized stream (DStream), represented as a
sequence of RDDs. Internally, the input data stream is divided
into micro-batches, with each micro-batch processed through
the entire application at once using high-level transformations
such as map, filter, and reduce. Transformations on RDDs
are divided and executed in parallel across the Spark cluster,
leading to fast and scalable parallel processing.
Figure 2 shows the key RDDs and transformations that are
executed in parallel within a micro-batch in Spark Streaming.
The input tweets for one micro-batch are randomly divided
into multiple data partitions that form the first RDD (named
“tweets” in Figure 2). Each input tweet is then mapped (op
#1) into an instance by applying the preprocessing, feature
extraction, and normalization steps described above. The la-
beled instances are then filtered (op #2) before the training can
take place using an aggregate operation (op #3). The training
is performed in two parts; in the first one, the local model
of each task is incrementally updated in parallel, while in the
second part the local models are merged together to update the
global model. The map, filter, and the first part of aggregate
are grouped together and executed using a set of parallel tasks.
The updated global model (with a serialized size of < 1 MB)
is then distributed across the cluster and is available for use
by the tasks in the next micro-batch. In addition, a new set of
parallel tasks perform the predictions (op #4) on all instances,
followed by the computation of local statistics (op # 5), such
as the number of true positives, false positives, etc. Finally, the
local statistics are used to compute (op # 6) global evaluation
metric such as accuracy, precision, and recall. The alerting
and sampling steps consume the “classified instances” RDD
and are also performed in parallel (not shown in the figure).
Overall, almost all processing steps are fully parallelizable and
can be executed on a cluster in an efficient and scalable manner
(evaluated in Section V-E).
Even though we have implemented our approach using
Spark Streaming, the proposed architecture is general enough
to be implemented in other DSPEs (e.g., Apache Storm,
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Fig. 3: Task-oriented view of parallel processing in other
distributed stream processing engines.
Heron, and Flink) that follow the per-record operator stream-
ing model (as opposed to micro-batching). These systems de-
ploy a directed acyclic graph of operators that process the data
stream in real time. As shown in Figure 3, an operator receives
one or more streams, performs a streaming computation (e.g.,
map, filter, aggregation), and may output one or more streams.
Each operator can have multiple instantiations as individual
tasks that run in parallel (Figure 3). Finally, each system has
its own mechanism for sharing and periodically updating a
shared state such as the global streaming model.
C. Supported ML Streaming Methods
Over the years, several online learning algorithms have been
developed for performing classification, regression, clustering,
and concept drift detection over evolving data streams. Some
frameworks such as Massive Online Analysis (MOA) [34] sup-
port streaming ML running on a single machine, while others
such as Apache SAMOA [35] implement several algorithms
over various DSPEs (e.g., Apache Storm or Flink). Similarly,
streamDM [36] is an open source software developed by
Huawei for mining big data streams using Spark Streaming.
In our system, we have used three streamDM classification
algorithms, namely Hoeffding Tree, Adaptive Random Forest,
and Streaming Logistic Regression.
Hoeffding Tree (HT). The HT is an incremental decision tree
learner designed for large data streams [37]. A tree node in
a HT is expanded as soon as there is sufficient statistical
evidence (based on the distribution-independent Hoeffding
bound) that an optimal splitting feature exists. The model
learned by the HT is asymptotically nearly identical to the one
built by a non-incremental learner, if the number of training
instances is large enough.
Adaptive Random Forest (ARF) of HTs. ARF is an adap-
tation of the classical Random Forest algorithm that uses an
effective resampling method based on online bagging and an
updated adaptive strategy to cope with evolving data streams
[38]. This ensemble classifier induces diversity through both
online bagging and randomly selecting subsets of features for
node splits.
Streaming Logistic Regression (SLR). Logistic Regression
is a standard ML linear method that uses a logistic function
to model a binary dependent variable (and can be easily
extended to a multi-class scenario). In the streaming setting,
the fitting is similar to that performed offline, but with the
model parameters updated online as new data arrives. Finally,
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) is used to optimize the
objective function.
IV. DATASETS & FEATURE EXTRACTION
A. Twitter Data
For our study, an abusive dataset provided by [6] is used,
where tweets are characterized as abusive, hateful, spam,
or normal. The authors conducted several annotation rounds
where different types of abusive behaviors were considered,
i.e., offensive, abusive, hateful speech, aggressive, bullying,
spam, and normal, to conclude to the aforementioned inap-
propriate speech categories. Then, an exploratory study was
carried out to determine the most representative labels related
to the types of abusive content. Overall, the dataset consists
of 100k tweets. Since our focus is on detecting aggressive
behaviors in a streaming way, we remove the 14k tweets
labeled as spam, as they can be handled with more specialized
techniques such as [39].
B. Feature Extraction
A wide range of characteristics can be considered for
representing users’ online presence and thus detecting the
existence of abusive behavior. Such features can come from
either the users’ profile, posted content, or their social network.
Authors in [5] studied a wide range of features falling in
the aforementioned categories. Inspired by their conducted
analysis and after our own investigation, we have selected the
most contributing features, with the aim of reducing execution
time without sacrificing performance. Indicatively, Figure 4
plots the PDF (Probability Density Function) of some of the
features presented next.
Profile Features. Features in this category include the age
of the account (i.e., number of days since its creation), the
number of posts a user has made, and the number of lists
subscribed to. From Figure 4a, we observe that, on average,
accounts that post normal content tend to be older (1, 487.74
days) compared to those that post abusive- (1, 291.97 days)
and hate- (1, 379.95 days) related content.
Text Features. This feature category includes some basic text
features, syntactic and stylistic ones, the sentiment expressed
in the posted content, as well as the existence of swear words
within posts.
• Basic: Number of hashtags used in a post, number of
uppercase words, and number of URLs. In Figure 4b, we
plot the distribution of the number of uppercase words
used in the abusive, hateful, and normal posts, finding that
in the abusive and hate related posts, users tend to write
with higher frequency in capital letters, which is quite
an expected result since uppercase text can be indicative
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Fig. 4: PDF of (a) Account age, (b) Uppercase letters, (c) Adjectives, (d) Mean words per sentence, (e) Sentiment (negative),
and (f) Swear words.
of intense emotional state or ‘shouting’. Specifically,
the average (STD) number of uppercase words for the
normal, hate, and abusive related posts are 0.96 (2.10),
1.57 (2.95), and 1.84 (3.27), respectively.
• Syntactic: We analyze the writing style of the authors
of a text. Specifically, we focus on Part-of-Speech (POS)
features, which depict the relative frequency of adjectives,
adverbs, and verbs in a text. Figure 4c focuses on the
number of adjectives used in the three studied categories
of users’ posts. We observe that abusive and hateful posts
tend to contain a lower number of adjectives in relation
to the normal posts. Adjectives, in general, are used to
describe nouns and pronouns, and thus the lower use of
them in the abusive/hate posts indicates that users may
prefer to carry out more direct attacks without adding
additional information.
• Stylistic: Mean number of words per sentence and mean
word length. Figure 4d depicts the PDF of the mean
number of words per sentence. It seems that normal posts
follow a more similar pattern with the hateful posts, with
normal posts containing somewhat more words (16.66
and 15.93 words on average, for the normal and hateful
posts, respectively). As for the abusive posts, they tend
to be shorter, and on average include 12.66 words per
sentence.
• Sentiment: In sentiment analysis, the objective is to
determine the authors’ attitude towards the topic under
discussion. To estimate how positive or negative is the
sentiment expressed in the posted content (on a [−5, 5]
scale), we proceed with the SentiStrength tool [40].
Comparing the distributions of the abusive and hateful
classes with the normal for the negatively expressed
sentiments (Figure 4e), we observe that normal posts
include significantly less negative sentiments.
• Swear Words: To estimate the number of existing curse
words within posts, we use a list of swear words obtained
from [41]. Figure 4f indicates that abusive and hateful
posts contain a significantly higher number of swear
words compared to the normal posts. Specifically, the
abusive and hateful posts include, on average, 2.54 and
1.84 swear words, respectively, where this number in case
of the normal posts equals to 0.10.
Finally, in addition to the aforementioned features, we employ
a new feature type, denoted as adaptive Bag of Words
(BoW). For this feature, a BoW is initialized with swear
words obtained from [41] and is periodically enhanced based
on tweet content. Specifically, we maintain two sets of word
counts and rolling statistics for aggressive (i.e., abusive and
hateful) and normal tweets. Words that occur frequently in
aggressive tweets, but are not high-occurring words in normal
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Fig. 5: Features evaluation based on Gini importance.
tweets are added in the BoW. Correspondingly, words that
are becoming popular in normal tweets but lose traction in
aggressive tweets are removed from the BoW. Hence, this
feature can adapt to changes in aggressive behaviors over time.
Network Features. This feature category aims to measure the
popularity of a user based on two different criteria, i.e., the
number of followers (in-degree centrality) and friends (out-
degree centrality). Overall, these measures can quantify a
user’s opportunity to have a positive or negative impact in
their ego-network in a direct way.
Features Evaluation. Figure 5 shows the features importance
based on Gini importance1 in descending order. We see that
the most important feature is the swear count, followed by
negative sentiment, number of words per sentence, mean word
length, account age, and count posts. Overall, we observe that
the text based features are among the most contributing ones.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency
of our approach to correctly detect aggressive behavior in a
large set of tweets. Our evaluation methodology is as follows:
1) We study the effect of preprocessing, normalization, and
the adaptive BoW feature on the streaming ML perfor-
mance (Section V-B).
2) We evaluate the performance of various streaming ML
methods (Section V-C).
3) We compare the performance of streaming and batch-
based methods (Section V-D).
4) We investigate the capability of our method to scale and
detect aggression on tweets at real-time (Section V-E).
5) We explore how generalizable our approach is in de-
tecting other related malign behaviors such as sarcasm,
sexism, or racism (Section V-F).
A. Experimental Setup
Our experiments were executed on a server with a 64-bit, 8-
core, 3.2GHz CPU, 64GB RAM, and a 2.1TB RAID 5 storage
1The importance of a feature is computed as the (normalized) total reduction
of the criterion brought by that feature.
TABLE I: Hyperparameter tuning for streaming models
Model Parameter Range or Options Selected
HT Split Criterion Gini, InfoGain InfoGain
Split Confidence 0.001 - 0.5 0.01
Tie Threshold 0.01 - 0.1 0.05
Grace Period 200 - 500 200
Max Tree Depth 10 - 30 20
ARF All HT parameters above
Ensemble Size 10 - 20 10
SLR Lambda 0.01 - 0.1 0.1
Regularizer Zero, L1, L2 L2
Regularization 0.001 - 0.1 0.01
configuration. To test the scalability of our system, we used a
3-node cluster, where each node has a 64-bit, 8-core, 2.4GHz
CPU, 24GB RAM, and three 500GB SAS hard drives. All
nodes were running CentOS Linux 7.2. We implemented our
approach over Apache Spark Streaming v2.3.2 and streamDM
v0.2.
The dataset used consists of 86k tweets, from which 53, 835,
27, 179, and 4, 970 were labeled as normal, abusive, and
hateful, respectively. Given the small number of hateful tweets,
we also experimented with the 2-class problem of detecting
whether the tweets where normal or aggressive (i.e., abusive
or hateful).
Hyperparameter Tuning. For each machine learning model
(streaming or batch), we used grid search to find optimal
parameter settings. Table I lists the value ranges or options
considered for each parameter for the three streaming ML
models used in our experimental evaluation, namely Hoeffding
Tree (HT ), Adaptive Random Forest (ARF ) of HT s, and
Streaming Logistic Regression (SLR) with SGD. The param-
eters and values for the equivalent batch models are similar.
Performance Metrics. In order to assess the performance of
the ML methods, we measure typical ML metrics such as
accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score. We picked F1-score
for demonstrating the performance of the methods, since it
integrates both precision and recall measures into a unified
measure, for a more general view of the performance. For the
streaming setting, we used the popular prequential evaluation
scheme, where instances are first used to test, and then to train
the streaming ML model.
B. Effect of Preprocessing, Normalization, and Adaptive BoW
Preprocessing. First, we investigate the impact of preprocess-
ing on the performance of streaming ML methods. We only
show results for HT as they are similar with the other two
methods. In Figure 6 we compare the F1-score of HT with
and without preprocessing of tweets. This is done for both
the 2- and 3-class problems while applying normalization and
the adaptive bag-of-words feature. We find that preprocessing
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Fig. 6: F1-score for HT for 2- or 3-class problem (c=2 or
3), when we apply normalization (n=ON) and adaptive bag of
words (ad=ON), and test the impact of preprocessing (p=ON
or OFF).
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Fig. 7: F1-score for HT for 2- or 3-class problem (c=2 or
3), when we apply preprocessing (p=ON) and adaptive bag of
words (ad=ON), and test the impact of normalization (n=ON
or OFF).
helps the classifier’s performance, by smoothing out transient
changes in the data and allowing the classifier to perform
in a more stable fashion. We also notice that when binary
classification is performed, the performance is better than
the 3-class problem. In the 3-class case, the small number
of hateful tweets makes it harder to correctly classify that
label, reducing the overall F1-score performance by about 4%
compared to the 2-class case.
Normalization. Next, we study the impact that normalization
has to the streaming ML methods. We tested the three forms
of normalization described in Section III-A and found that
minmax without outliers leads to a slightly better performance
(around 2%). Hence, this is the form we used for our subse-
quent experiments. Figure 7 reveals that enabling or disabling
normalization has a marginal effect on the performance of HT
for both the 2- and 3-class problems. However, the same is
not true for the other two methods. As Figure 8 demonstrates,
enabling normalization in SLR increases F1-score by over
42%, regardless of class setup, while it also smooths out
performance. For ARF , the impact of normalization is also
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Fig. 8: F1-score for SLR for 2- or 3-class problem (c=2 or
3), when we apply preprocessing (p=ON) and adaptive bag of
words (ad=ON), and test the impact of normalization (n=ON
or OFF).
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
F1
-s
co
re
Tweets (thousands)
HT, p=ON, n=ON, ad=OFF, c=3 HT, p=ON, n=ON, ad=ON, c=3
HT, p=ON, n=ON, ad=OFF, c=2 HT, p=ON, n=ON, ad=ON, c=2
Fig. 9: F1-score for HT for 2- or 3-class problem (c=2 or
3), when we apply preprocessing (p=ON) and normalization
(n=ON), and test the impact of applying adaptive bag of words
(ad=ON or OFF).
profound and there can be up to 30-60% difference in F1-score
for the two class setups (not shown due to space constrains).
Adaptive BoW. In Figure 9, we demonstrate the results when
applying the adaptive bag-of-words feature in HT as opposed
to using a fixed bag-of-words (recall Section IV-B). We find
that employing this feature helps the ML performance with an
average improvement of 2-4% on the F1-score; this is true for
both the 2- and 3-class setup. We also note that the adaptive
list helps the ML performance to be smoother and more
resilient in changes of word distribution through time. These
results are similar for the other two streaming ML methods.
Finally, Figure 10 reveals that the size of this adaptive list
does not greatly increase through time. In particular, the list is
initialized with 347 swear words obtained from [41], and after
the 86k tweets are parsed, it reaches a total of 529 words.
Key takeaways. Preprocessing and adaptive BoW offer mod-
est benefits on performance (about 2-4% higher F1-score) and
better stability through time. Normalization, on the other hand,
is model-dependent: it has a negligible impact for HT but
a significant impact on ARF and SLR. Finally, all methods
perform better on the 2-class, compared to the 3-class problem.
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Fig. 10: Size of the adaptive bag of words (BoW) while
processing tweets.
TABLE II: Key evaluation metric for HT , ARF , and SLR
Metric 3-class 2-class
HT ARF SLR HT ARF SLR
Accuracy 0.89 0.85 0.89 0.93 0.92 0.93
Precision 0.85 0.80 0.85 0.92 0.85 0.91
Recall 0.89 0.85 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.91
F1-score 0.87 0.83 0.87 0.91 0.89 0.91
C. Performance of Streaming ML Methods
After investigating the preliminary results on how prepro-
cessing, normalization, and adaptive BoW affect performance
of the detection methods, we enable all three and proceed to
compare results for all streaming ML methods tested, for the
3- and 2-class problems. Table II shows some key evaluation
metrics for the three methods for the 3- and 2-class problems.
3-class Problem. Figure 11 shows results for the 3-class
problem. We notice that all methods achieve an F1-score
in the range of 80-90%. The HT and SLR offer a similar
high performance, with HT occasionally reaching higher F1-
scores (0.5% higher on average). On the other hand, ARF
always underperforms with about 4% less F1-score over time.
Through time, all methods exhibit similar trends, i.e., their
variability in performance is similar. This means they are
affected in a similar manner by transient changes in the
distributions of the available features. In addition, HT and
SLR take ∼5-10k instances to reach their full capacity with
respect to detection performance. Interestingly, ARF takes
longer (∼10-15k instances) to plateau its performance.
2-class Problem. In a similar fashion, Figure 12 shows the
results for the 2-class problem. This is a simpler classification
problem, and thus, the ML performance increases across all
methods and reaches to over 91% F1-score. In fact, HT ’s
performance is increased by up to 4% in the F1-score. This is
expected given that the minority hateful label is now merged
with the abusive label and the data imbalance is avoided.
Finally, HT and SLR are able to reach their full potential
quicker than the 3-class problem (after 5k tweets), whereas
ARF requires around the same number of tweets (∼15k).
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Fig. 11: F1-score for HT , ARF , and SLR for 3-class
problem (c=3), when we apply preprocessing, normalization
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Key takeaways. HT either performs better or similar to the
other streaming ML methods (with 87-91% F1-score) and it
reaches its peak performance quickly (after 5-8k tweets).
D. Streaming vs. Batch ML Methods
One of the key differences between streaming and batch ML
methods is that streaming methods only observe each instance
once, whereas batch methods typically process each instance
multiple times. Hence, it is important to compare the perfor-
mance of our three streaming methods with corresponding (or
similar) batch methods. In particular, we tested the Decision
Tree J48, Random Forest, and Logistic Regression using the
ML software WEKA v3.7 [42].
As our Twitter dataset was collected over a period of 10
consecutive days (of ∼8-9k tweets each day), we examine the
following two training scenarios for our batch methods. In the
“train-first-day test-all-others”, the batch method is trained in
the data of the first day, and then it is only tested on the
data of each subsequent day. This scenario represents the case
where the model is not updated, and can become stale over
time. The second scenario is the “train-one-day test-next-day”,
where the batch method is trained on data of one day and
tested on the next day. Then, it is trained on the data of the
subsequent day and tested on the day after, etc. This scenario
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Fig. 13: F1-score for HT vs. DT , for 3-class problem,
for two batch-based training methods (train-first-day test-all-
others and train-one-day test-next-day).
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Fig. 14: F1-score for HT vs. DT , for 2-class problem,
for two batch-based training methods (train-first-day test-all-
others and train-one-day test-next-day).
represents a case closer to what a pseudo-streaming method
would be doing: periodically (daily in this case) update the
model on newly acquired and labeled data.
Interestingly, the performance of the batch methods were
very similar in all scenarios. Thus, we only show comparison
results between the best streaming method (HT ) and its
corresponding batch method, i.e., the decision tree (DT ).
3-class Problem. Under the 3-class problem, the HT per-
forms at least as good as the batch method (DT ) for both
training scenarios, as shown in Figure 13. Interestingly, and
expectedly, the performance of the batch method for the
first scenario (“train-first-day test-all-others”) degrades slowly
through time. After the processing of 86k tweets, we observe
a degradation of about 2% in F1-score from the beginning
of the experiment, when the training was finalized on the 1st
day. In the second setup, the batch method performs somewhat
better: the model gets updated with new data every day, and
therefore, it can keep up with transient changes in the features’
distributions. However, HT still performs better than this
batch method for this training scenario, as it is able to adapt
to changes in a more fine-grained manner.
2-class Problem. In Figure 14, we repeat the same experiment
but for the 2-class problem. We observe that the performance
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Fig. 15: Execution time per streaming system, given a number
of incoming tweets to be processed.
of the batch method (DT ) for the two training scenarios is
very similar and fairly stable through time. As for the HT ’s
performance, it is slightly lower the first few days compared to
the DT , with less than 1% difference on average in F1-score.
Afterwards, the HT ’s performance is on par with the DT ’s
performance.
Key takeaways. Even though a streaming ML method pro-
cesses each instance only once, it is able to achieve the same
performance – and in some cases even better – compared to
similar, batch-based ML methods.
E. Scalability for Real-time Detection on Twitter
In this section, we study the capability for our framework
to gracefully scale and process more tweets through time. For
our evaluation, we test different flavors of Spark execution,
namely single-threaded (SparkSingle), multi-threaded on one
machine (SparkLocal), and multi-threaded across 3 machines
(SparkCluster). For comparison purposes, we also imple-
mented our approach over MOA v19.05.0, an open-source
framework containing several state-of-the-art ML algorithms
for data streams [43]. However, MOA is a single-threaded
ML engine and does not allow parallelized processing.
For each setting, we process a fixed number of unlabeled
tweets (ranged from 250k to 2m tweets) intermixed with
the 86k labeled tweets. We measure the computation cost in
terms of total execution time, which accounts for the entire
processing pipelining (feature extraction, training, prediction,
and evaluation; recall Section III-A). Finally, we also study
throughput under each setting. The results presented next
pertain to using HT with preprocessing, normalization, and
the adaptive BoW feature enabled for the 3-class problem.
First, we compare how the execution time varies for pro-
cessing a fixed number of tweets, while using MOA or
Spark as the underlying framework (Figure 15). On the
one hand, we confirm that MOA and SparkSingle have a
similar performance, where doubling the number of tweets
to be processed approximately doubles the execution time
taken to process them. This is to be expected, since the
two frameworks operate on one machine and process tweets
sequentially. Interestingly, SparkSingle exhibits about 7-17%
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Fig. 16: Throughput per streaming system, given a number of
incoming tweets to be processed.
worse performance than MOA due to management overheads
in Spark engine for scheduling the micro-batches. This is
again expected, as Spark has been designed to optimally pro-
cess big data in parallel infrastructures, instead of sequentially
such as in MOA.
On the other hand, we find that when Spark is allowed
to operate in a multi-threaded environment, on a single or
multiple machines, the performance greatly improves. Such a
setup, can process the same number of tweets much faster than
the single-threaded Spark or MOA. For example, to process 2
million tweets, SparkLocal and SparkCluster needed 5.5×
and 13.2× less time, respectively, than SparkSingle. Also,
SparkCluster processed the same number of tweets in 2.5×
less time than SparkLocal.
Finally, we compare the throughput of these framework se-
tups in tweets per second (Figure 16). We clearly see major dif-
ference in performance of SparkCluster over SparkLocal,
and the superiority of such a setup over the single-threaded
Spark and MOA (which have a constant throughput of
∼1100 tweets per seconds). In particular, we observe that
with a single worker, the multi-threaded SparkLocal setup
can process about 6k tweets per second. When the machines
triple, the SparkCluster can process up to 14.5k tweets per
second. Interestingly, these two setups demonstrate a plateau
in their throughput performance after about 1 million tweets
are fed into the ML pipeline.
Key takeaways. These performance results clearly demon-
strate the scalability of our streaming approach, in order to
achieve real-time aggression detection. In fact, if we assume
the publicly claimed number of arrivals of tweets in the overall
Twitter Firehose to be about 9k tweets per second [22], our
results show that the proposed ML pipeline could easily tackle
this stream of tweets and detect such aggressive behavior with
only 3 Spark machines.
F. Detecting Related Behaviors in Real Time
This section investigates whether our streaming ML ap-
proach can be adopted to detect other undesired behaviors on
Twitter, in addition to aggressive behavior. For his purpose,
we acquired two more datasets:
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Fig. 17: ML performance of HT vs. original (batch-based)
performance for the Sarcasm [44] and Offensive [8] datasets.
• The Sarcasm dataset is focused on detecting sarcasm in
tweets, and is provided by [44]. The dataset contains 6.5k
sarcastic tweets, out of 61k total.
• The Offensive dataset is focused on detecting racism and
sexism in tweets, and is provided by [8]. The dataset
contains 2k racist and 3k sexists tweets, out of 16k total.
We tested both datasets using the HT model, trained and
evaluated with the original features as described in the respec-
tive papers. Figure 17 compares the performance achieved by
HT with the best performance reported by the authors. Both
datasets were originally evaluated using logistic regression and
10-fold cross validation. For the Sarcasm dataset, an accuracy
of 93% was reported in [44] (F1-score was not available).
The HT model started with an accuracy of 86%, which
gradually increased through time. Accuracy crossed the 90%
mark after 19k tweets and slowly converged towards 93%. For
the Offensive dataset, a 74% F1-score was reported in [8].
Even though the HT ’s performance started at 58% F1-score,
it quickly increased to 73% after processing the 16k tweets.
Key takeaways. The streaming ML paradigm can be applied
for detecting other malign behaviors in Twitter, with its
performance reaching similar levels over time as the batch-
based ML methods.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we have developed an aggression detection
framework for social media, where the entire processing
pipeline – from preprocessing and feature extraction to training
and testing – employs the data streaming paradigm. As a result,
the streaming ML model is incrementally updated and remains
always up-to-date, despite any transient aggression behaviors.
At the same time, the framework is remarkably scalable, as it is
capable to consume and potentially process the entire Twitter
Firehose with only 3 commodity machines. The evaluation
results show that the streaming ML models can perform better
or similar to popular batch-based ML methods, achieving over
90% accuracy, precision, and recall after processing just a
few thousand tweets. Finally, we showed that our proposed
streaming ML framework can be easily applied to detect other
types of abusive behavior such as sarcasm, racism, and sexism,
with minimal effort.
As part of future work, we plan to extend our current
prototype into a unified framework for the real-time detection
of a variety of behaviors (e.g., bullying, aggressive, abusive,
offensive, racist, sexist) for diverse social media platforms
such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and Snapchat.
As some forms of behaviors, like cyberbullying and trolling,
usually involve repetitive hostile actions, we also plan to inves-
tigate detecting such behaviors at the level of media sessions
(e.g., for a group of tweets from the same user, for a set of
comments under a post). For this purpose, we can utilize the
windowing functionalities provided by all distributed stream
processing engines for performing the groupings in a scalable
and timely manner.
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